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INTRODUCTION
When a federal court sentences a defendant to prison, the
judge may choose to impose a term of supervised release.,
Supervised release is a "system of post-incarceration
supervision"2 designed to help reintegrate defendants into their
communities and to protect public safety by requiring that
defendants follow conditions advancing these two goals. 3 In
making this choice, judges are required by 18 USC § 3553(a) to
independently weigh the imposition of discretionary conditions4
and by 18 USC § 3553(c) to provide reasons for imposing discre-
tionary conditions to ensure that they are tailored to the
defendant's circumstances. 5 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
recently observed that sentencing judges regularly fail to fulfill
this legal duty by forgoing independent assessments of the
t BA 2012, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2016, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 See 18 USC § 3583(a) ("The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprison-
ment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement
that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.").
2 Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised
Release, 88 NYU L Rev 958, 960 (2013).
3 See United States v Gementera, 379 F3d 596, 602 (9th Cir 2004) (explaining that
supervised release conditions are designed to protect the public and rehabilitate the de-
fendant). See also United States v Jeanes, 150 F3d 483, 485 (5th Cir 1998) ("The supervised
release term serves a broader, societal purpose by reducing recidivism.").
4 18 USC § 3553(a) ("The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.").
These purposes include reflection on the seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just
punishment, adequate deterrence, protection of the public, and provision of services and
treatment to the defendant. See 18 USC § 3553(a).
5 18 USC § 3553(c) ("The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court
the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.").
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appropriateness of discretionary conditions for individual
defendants.6 In particular, judges appear to frequently impose
thirteen discretionary conditions recommended by the United
States Sentencing Commission-called "standard conditions"7-
without considering whether they enhance public safety or
rehabilitation in each case.8
This practice is troubling because Congress intended
supervised release to be curative, not punitive. 9 Since courts
already punish defendants with prison sentences, Congress
instructed judges to consider only nonpunitive factors when
imposing conditions of supervised release. O By imposing standard
conditions without considering their applicability to particular
defendants, courts expand defendants' liability for violating
conditions of supervised release, which can itself carry a new
prison term." More fundamentally, unjustified discretionary
supervised release conditions unduly restrict defendants' freedom
of association and will probably go unchallenged by most
defendants.12 "[O]nce a defendant is serving supervised release,
6 See United States v Siegel, 753 F3d 705, 711, 717 (7th Cir 2014) (observing that
judges often do not independently evaluate the § 3553(a) factors but instead accept the
probation officer's and counsel's recommendations). See also Christine S. Scott-Hayward,
Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised Release, 18 Berkeley J Crim L
180, 183 (2013) ("[T]he widespread imposition of supervised release occurs without any
apparent consideration of either an individual's risk to public safety or his or her rehabil-
itation needs.").
7 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c) (2014)
("USSG") (listing the standard conditions of supervised release).
8 See Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 2).
9 See 18 USC § 3583(c) (outlining the factors that sentencing judges should consider
when deciding whether to impose a term of supervised release and excluding from this list
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), which provides that a sentence should "provide just punishment for the
offense"). See also United States v Kappes, 782 F3d 828, 836 (7th Cir 2015) ("Supervised
release was not intended to be imposed for the purposes of punishment or incapacitation,
since those purposes will have been served to the extent necessary by the term of impris-
onment.") (quotation marks omitted); United States v Murray, 692 F3d 273, 280 (3d Cir
2012) (noting that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) "reinforces the idea that the primary
purpose of supervised release is to facilitate the reentry of offenders into their communi-
ties, rather than to inflict punishment").
10 See 18 USC § 3583(c). See also note 9.
11 See Scott-Hayward, 18 Berkeley J Crim L at 182 (cited in note 6) ("On average,
one third of [ ] individuals [imprisoned and receiving a term of supervised release] will
have their supervised release revoked, most as a result of technical violations, and receive,
on average, a new prison sentence of 11 months.").
12 See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(8) ("[Tihe defendant shall not frequent places where con-
trolled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered."); USSG
§ 5D1.3(c)(9) ("[T]he defendant ... shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony
unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer."). See also Siegel, 753 F3d at
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he typically finds himself without the right to counsel and may
lack the legal sophistication to recognize the potential infirmities
in the conditions he has been ordered to obey."'1 Given these
stakes, judicial inattention to discretionary supervised release
conditions warrants further inquiry. 14
This Comment advances the literature on this problem by
providing the first examination of sentencing judges' compliance
with § 3553(c) when imposing discretionary conditions of
supervised release.15 In making this contribution, this Comment
offers insight into the effectiveness of appellate guidance in
mitigating this problem. It appears that appellate guidance has
had little effect on sentencing judges' regular noncompliance with
their obligation to provide reasons for imposing discretionary
conditions of supervised release and may be an ineffective remedy
for this problem.16 Based on both this' observation and
consideration of behavioral psychology literature, this Comment
argues that the current format of the judgment-and-commitment
form used by judges to impose supervised release hinders their
ability to fulfill this legal obligation. By presenting standard
conditions in boilerplate language on this form, federal courts
have established a default format that creates recurring
opportunities for judicial noncompliance. Ultimately, this
Comment advocates two proposals. First, sentencing judges
should eliminate the boilerplate language used to impose
standard conditions. Second, sentencing judges should hold
follow-up sentencing hearings when they lack adequate
information to comply with their sentencing obligations.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the
legislative purpose of supervised release and the legal
711 ("Criminals who court long prison sentences tend to ... give little weight to future
costs and benefits.").
13 Kappes, 782 F3d at 853.
14 Moreover, discretionary conditions of supervised release are often overly broad
and vague. For a discussion of this problem and a proposed solution, see Part III.A.
15 Professor Fiona Doherty has previously flagged the existence of this problem but
did not examine it in depth. See Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1002 (cited in note 2). Further,
previous scholarship has raised general concerns about judges' failure to explain their
reasons for imposing terms of supervised release. See, for example, Scott-Hayward, 18
Berkeley J Crim L at 208-09 (cited in note 6) (finding, in a study of criminal cases in the
Eastern District of New York between February and April 2012, that no judge ever "ex-
plain[ed] why he or she was imposing supervised release or justif[ied] the length of the
term imposed"). Finally, Judge Richard Posner underscored this problem in a recent judi-
cial opinion. See Siegel, 753 F3d at 707-11.
16 See Part II.B.
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requirements for imposing it. Part II first explains the practical
importance of judicial compliance with § 3553(c). It then examines
judges' compliance with § 3553(c) and finds that noncompliance
is the norm. Part II concludes by explaining the principal factors
contributing to judicial noncompliance with this sentencing
obligation. After surveying relevant behavioral psychology
research, Part III recommends feasible changes to courts'
judgment-and-commitment-form and sentencing practices to help
alleviate this problem.
I. THE PURPOSE AND IMPOSITION OF DISCRETIONARY
SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS
In order to contextualize this Comment's argument, it is
important to first consider the congressional intent underlying
supervised release and the relevant legal standards and
requirements for imposing supervised release. Congress
identified the purpose of supervised release and provided the
relevant legal standards and requirements in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 198417 ("Sentencing Reform Act"). A close review of
the legislative history reveals that judges' noncompliance with
their sentencing obligations implicates the central issues that the
Sentencing Reform Act was intended to address: namely,
"fairness and certainty in sentencing" and a reduction in sentenc-
ing disparities based on defendants' demographic characteris-
tics.18 By imposing the same thirteen standard conditions on al-
most all defendants, judges may be creating undesirable
sentencing uniformity.19
This Part begins by examining Congress's intent in creating
supervised release and then describes discretionary conditions
that sentencing judges can impose to effectuate Congress's intent.
This Part concludes by explaining sentencing judges' statutory
obligation to provide reasons for all discretionary conditions of su-
pervised release imposed and by considering a relevant circuit
split regarding this obligation.
17 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and
28 USC § 991 et seq.
18 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess
38, 56-57 (1983), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3182, 3221, 3239-40.
19 Sentencing unformity can be undesirable if it results from sentencing judges'
failure to consider the legal threshold for imposing particular standard conditions in each
case. See Part I.B.
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A. The Legislative History of Supervised Release
Aiming to produce fairer sentences and reduce undesirable
sentencing inequalities, the Sentencing Reform Act replaced the
federal parole system with a supervised release system. 20 In
passing the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress importantly altered
the timing for when defendants begin postimprisonment
supervision. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, defendants first
complete their prison sentences and then begin supervised
release.21 This timing diverges from the former probation system
because it substitutes portions of defendants' prison sentences
with parole, thereby potentially shortening defendants' prison
terms. 22 Due to uncertainty as to when defendants would be
released from prison, the probation system "sometimes fooled the
judges, sometimes disappointed the offender, and often misled the
public," and thereby undermined sentencing fairness.23 To make
sentencing fairer, Congress designed supervised release to be
nonpunitive and therefore intended that supervised release be
imposed only when necessary, rather than as a universal
practice .24
To this end, the Senate report accompanying the bill
specifically explained the purpose of supervised release to assist
sentencing judges with identifying defendants who should receive
terms. Congress declared that the "primary goal" of supervised
release is
to ease the defendant's transition into the community after
the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious of-
fense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has
spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other
20 See S Rep No 98-225 at 37-39 (cited in note 18).
21 See United States v Siegel, 753 F3d 705, 707 (7th Cir 2014).
22 See USSG § 1A1.3 (describing how the parole system "empower[s] the parole
commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would serve in
prison").
23 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 4 (1988).
24 See S Rep No 98-225 at 123 (cited in note 18) ("[T]he question whether the defend-
ant will be supervised following his term of imprisonment is dependent on whether the
judge concludes that he needs supervision, rather than on the question whether a particu-
lar amount of his term of imprisonment remains.") (emphasis added). See also United
States v Kappes, 782 F3d 828, 836-37 (7th Cir 2015) ("Supervised release .. giv[es] dis-
trict courts the freedom to provide postrelease supervision for those, and only those, who
need[ ] it. Congress aimed [ ] to use the district courts' discretionary judgment to allocate
supervision to those releasees who needed it most.").
20151 1415
The University of Chicago Law Review
purposes but still needs supervision and training programs
after release.25
Supervised release thus imposes high decision costs on
sentencing judges because they confront two difficult choices.
First, although some statutes dictate that convicted defendants
must receive supervised release terms, 26 sentencing judges must
otherwise determine whether supervised release should be
imposed. This decision requires the sentencing judge to weigh the
recommendations of the assigned probation officers and parties'
counsel and to assess whether the defendant's public-safety
threat and rehabilitation needs indicate that he requires the
supervision of probation officers.27 Second, if the judge decides
that a supervised release term should be imposed, he must then
consider only the discretionary conditions that can be imposed
without making the sentence punitive. As detailed further in Part
II.C.1, the fact that this decision is made during sentencing
hearings compounds the difficulty of a judge's task because judges
often have inadequate information about defendants'
postincarceration needs at the time of sentencing. By passing the
Sentencing Reform Act, Congress placed a major burden on
sentencing judges that requires substantial consideration of
defendants' likely postimprisonment situations for supervised
release to adhere to congressional intent.
Before discussing discretionary conditions of supervised re-
lease, this Section concludes with a typical example of the process
for imposing supervised release. In United States v Glover,2s the
defendant pleaded guilty to "[p]ossession with intent to distribute
heroin" and "[plossession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime."29 At sentencing, the court devoted its attention
to determining the defendant's prison sentence and deemed su-
pervised release necessary to protect public safety.30 The proba-
tion officer then recommended that standard conditions of super-
vised release be imposed, which the sentencing judge agreed to do
25 S Rep No 98-225 at 124 (cited in note 18).
26 See, for example, 21 USC §§ 841(b), 960(b) (detailing mandatory minimum terms
for defendants convicted of various drug offenses).
27 See note 24.
28 Judgment in a Criminal Case, Criminal Action No 10-00981 (ND Ill filed June 19,
2013) ("Glover Judgment and Commitment Order").
29 Id at *1.
30 See Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United States v Glover, Criminal Action
No 10-00981, *29-31 (ND Ill filed Aug 14, 2013) ("Glover Transcript").
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without explanation.31 One week later, the sentencing judge com-
pleted the case's judgment-and-commitment order and left un-
touched the thirteen standard conditions already written on the
form.32
B. Discretionary Conditions of Supervised Release
If a sentencing judge determines that a defendant should re-
ceive a term of supervised release, the defendant becomes bound
upon release from prison both by mandatory conditions of super-
vised release and by any discretionary conditions that the judge
decides to impose. 33 There are eight mandatory conditions: six
that apply in all cases, 34 one that applies only to sex offenders,35
and one that applies only to defendants convicted of domestic vi-
olence for the first time.36 The six generally applicable mandatory
conditions specify the following prohibitions and requirements:
(1) "the defendant [shall] not commit another Federal, State, or
local crime during the term of supervision";37 (2) "the defendant
[shall] not unlawfully possess a controlled substance";38 (3) "the
defendant [shall] cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample...
if ... authorized";39 (4) "the defendant [shall] refrain from any
unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test
within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least 2 pe-
riodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of
a controlled substance";40 (5) the defendant shall pay all fines im-
posed by the court; 41 and (6) the defendant shall pay restitution
31 Id at *32-33 ("Ms. Fowlie: ... The Probation Department would also like for him
to be ordered to abide by the standard as well as additional conditions of supervised re-
lease. The Court: Yes. The defendant shall abide by the standard requirements of super-
vised release.").
32 See Glover Judgment and Commitment Order at *3 (cited in note 28).
33 See USSG § 5D1.3(a); 18 USC § 3583(a), (d).
34 See 18 USC § 3624(e) (requiring the defendant to pay all fines imposed by the
court); 18 USC § 3583(d) (listing four of the six mandatory conditions that apply in all
cases); 18 USC §§ 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3013, 3663, 3663A, 3664 (requiring the defend-
ant to pay restitution and an assessment).
35 See 18 USC § 3583(d) (requiring registration as a sex offender if the relevant state
law requires it).
36 See 18 USC § 3583(d) (requiring attendance at a domestic violence rehabilitation
program).
37 18 USC § 3583(d).
38 18 USC § 3583(d).
39 18 USC § 3583(d).
40 18 USC § 3583(d).
41 See 18 USC § 3624(e).
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and an assessment imposed by the court.42 Since a defendant's
circumstances might require further supervision beyond these
mandatory conditions, sentencing judges have the authority to
impose discretionary conditions that are tailored both to the risk
a defendant poses to public safety and to his rehabilitative
needs.43
To assist judges with exercising this authority, the
Sentencing Commission recommends fifteen "standard
conditions" and fifteen "special conditions" of supervised release.44
Several of the fifteen standard conditions address the
administration of supervised release or appear necessary to
advance its purposes while others relate to individual defendants'
underlying substantive offenses. The administrative category of
standard conditions includes requirements that the defendant
"report to the probation officer as directed by the court or proba-
tion officer,"45 "answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation of-
ficer,"46 and "notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours
of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer."47
The second category encompasses requirements that the defend-
ant "work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the
probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable rea-
sons"48 and, "as directed by the probation officer,... notify third
parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's crimi-
nal record."49 The final category includes requirements that the
defendant "not associate with any persons engaged in criminal
activity,"50 "not associate with any person convicted of a felony
unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer," ' and
"not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally
sold."52
According to the Sentencing Commission, "[s]everal of the
[standard] conditions are expansions of the [mandatory] condi-
tions required by statute" 3 and these fifteen standard conditions
42 See 18 USC §§ 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3013, 3663, 3663A, 3664.
43 See USSG § 5D1.3(b).
44 See USSG § 5D1.3(c)-(e).
45 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(2).
46 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(3).
47 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(11).
48 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(5).
49 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(13).
50 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(9).
51 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(9).
52 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(8).
53 USSG § 5D1.3(c).
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"mostly track the [statutorily defined] discretionary conditions of
probation."54 However, Professor Doherty contends that "[i]n ac-
tuality, none of the recommended 'standard' conditions are re-
quired by statute for supervised release; they are all expan-
sions."55 A close reading of § 3583(d) indicates that the fifteen
standard conditions are not mandatory under this statute, but
that the standard conditions could meet the required criteria for
discretionary supervised release conditions under this provision
and for discretionary probation conditions under 18 USC
§ 3563(b). Section 3583(d) provides that "[t]he court may order...
any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation
in section 3563(b) and any other condition it considers to be ap-
propriate"56 so long as such condition:
(1) is reasonably related to the [background of the offense, the
offender, or one of the nonpunitive purposes of
sentencing];
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary for the [relevant purposes of
sentencing]; and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission. 57
The Sentencing Commission also recommends additional
conditions called "special conditions" of supervised release.58
These include restrictions on a defendant's possession of weapons,
lines of credit, and occupations; participation in substance abuse
and mental health programs; and the provision of financial infor-
mation to probation officers.59 As intended by the Sentencing
Commission, special conditions are less generally applicable be-
cause they are tailored to a defendant's particular circumstances,
such as criminal history, health, prison sentence, and danger to
the public.60 In addition to these fifteen special conditions, judges
54 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised
Release *10 (July 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/WW7Y-MMFC.
55 Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 2).
56 18 USC § 3583(d).
57 18 USC § 3583(d). See also Siegel, 753 F3d at 707-08, quoting Doherty, 88 NYU L
Rev at 1012 (cited in note 2) (paraphrasing the requirements of 18 USC § 3583(d)(1)-(3)).
58 USSG § 5D1.3(d)-(e).
59 USSG § 5D1.3(d)-(e).
60 See USSG § 5D1.3(d)-(e).
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have the discretion to "impose special conditions of their own de-
vising, provided the conditions comply with overall federal sen-
tencing policy as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."61
For a court to impose a standard or special condition, the
sentencing judge must determine that the condition meets the
three aforementioned criteria. Determining whether this
standard is met for each defendant demands significant attention
from sentencing judges-they must make individualized and very
fact-intensive decisions for the vast majority of criminal
defendants serving prison sentences who also receive terms of
supervised release. According to the Sentencing Commission,
"[o]ver 95 percent of offenders in each of the sentencing guide-
lines' Criminal History Categories (CHCs) I through VI who were
sentenced to prison received terms of supervised release [between
2005 and 2009]."62 The Sentencing Commission's
recommendation of standard and special conditions thus helps
reduce the decision costs judges face when deciding which
discretionary conditions to impose.
C. The Explanatory Requirement for Imposing Discretionary
Supervised Release Conditions
Along with the statutory requirement that judges
independently evaluate the discretionary conditions imposed,
Congress created an additional sentencing requirement for
judges. In § 3553(c), Congress established a requirement that
sentencing judges explain the reasons for imposing discretionary
conditions at the time of sentencing: "The court, at the time of
sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence. 63 This statute "requires the sentencing
judge to explain how his sentence ... comports with the sentenc-
ing factors listed in section 3553(a)."64 Thus, "a district judge is
61 United States v Bryant, 754 F3d 443, 444 (7th Cir 2014).
62 USSC, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release at *4 (cited in note 54).
Excluding criminal convictions for aliens illegally reentering the United States, sentenc-
ing judges in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois imposed
terms of supervised release on 96.8 percent of the defendants sentenced to serve prison
terms from June 19, 2013, to July 18, 2013, and from June 19, 2014, to July 18, 2014. For
a discussion of why illegal reentry into the United States was excluded from this calcula-
tion, see id at *60 & n 256. For a critique that supervised release is excessively imposed,
see generally Scott-Hayward, 18 Berkeley J Crim L 180 (cited in note 6).
63 18 USC § 3553(c). See also United States v McMillian, 777 F3d 444, 451 (7th Cir
2015) (explaining that a sentencing judge must give reasons for all of the discretionary
conditions he imposes).
64 Siegel, 753 F3d at 711.
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required to give a reason, consistent with the sentencing factors
in section 3553(a), for.., any non-mandatory conditions of super-
vised release,65 but he "need not give a speech about each condi-
tion."6 Merely providing reasons for imposing a term of super-
vised release violates § 3553(c) when discretionary conditions are
also imposed, because such an explanation fails to provide rea-
sons for "the particular sentence" imposed. 67 By requiring that
sentencing judges explain the discretionary conditions imposed,
§ 3553(c) helps ensure that sentencing judges independently
evaluate the appropriateness of each condition for a particular
defendant.68
Although no court has explicitly challenged this explanatory
requirement, a circuit split has arisen over whether standard con-
ditions, when not announced by the judge at sentencing, can be
implicit in the imposition of supervised release. The First, Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have answered this question in the af-
firmative,9 while the Seventh Circuit has rejected this position.70
While this split does not implicate the explanatory requirement
for special conditions, it does create a division among the courts
regarding the explanatory requirement for standard conditions.
The majority rule effectively absolves judges from the explana-
tory requirement because sentencing judges probably cannot
65 Bryant, 754 F3d at 445. Discretionary conditions that are imposed but lack expla-
nations are nonetheless authoritative. See id at 447. In cases in which a defendant appeals
particular discretionary conditions that lack explanation, appellate courts appear to va-
cate defendants' sentences and remand for resentencing. But judges can restore these con-
ditions with adequate reasons. See McMillian, 777 F3d at 452; Kappes, 782 F3d at 867.
66 Kappes, 782 F3d at 846.
67 18 USC § 3553(c).
68 For an in-depth discussion of the purpose of § 3553(c), see Part II.A.
69 See, for example, United States v Sepzilveda-Contreras, 466 F3d 166, 169 (1st Cir
2006) ("Defendants are deemed to be on constructive notice for .., standard conditions
announced for the first time in a written judgment, and therefore have no right-to-be-
present claim with respect to any such condition."); United States v Thomas, 299 F3d 150,
153 (2d Cir 2002) ("[W]e held that a written judgment does not conflict with an oral sen-
tence where a district court fails to specify conditions of supervised release orally, but
nevertheless includes in the written judgment conditions listed as mandatory or standard
in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a) or (c)."); United States v Swanson, 209 Fed Appx 522, 524 (6th Cir
2006) ("[W]e hold that unless the district court specifically says otherwise, the standard
conditions of supervised release are deemed included in the oral sentence."); United States
v Napier, 463 F3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir 2006) ("[I]mposition of... standard conditions is
deemed to be implicit in an oral sentence imposing supervised release.").
70 See United States v Johnson, 765 F3d 702, 710-11 (7th Cir 2014) (declaring that
conditions specified only in a written order, when other discretionary conditions were spec-
ified orally, lack legal authority).
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provide reasons for the standard conditions imposed if these con-
ditions are not announced at sentencing. This Comment therefore
addresses this circuit split and shows how the judicially created
majority rule complicates judges' statutory obligation to inde-
pendently assess and explain the standard conditions imposed.
The First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have offered
three distinct justifications for their rule that standard conditions
are implicit in the imposition of supervised release. The First Cir-
cuit has noted that "standard conditions either impose require-
ments essential to the basic administration of the supervised re-
lease system, or regulate other matters necessary to effect the
purpose of supervised release," such that standard conditions nec-
essarily follow from the imposition of supervised release.71 The
Second Circuit has reasoned similarly.72 Second, the Ninth Circuit
has stated that standard conditions "are sufficiently detailed
[such] that many courts find it unnecessarily burdensome to re-
cite them in full as part of the oral sentence. For [this] reason....
standard conditions [are] deemed to be implicit in an oral sen-
tence imposing supervised release." 73 Third, the Sixth Circuit has
interpreted 18 USC § 3583(f) to mean that the sentencing judge
"will not read at sentencing each of the standard conditions im-
posed on a defendant, and will leave the administration of super-
vision to a duly authorized probation officer."74 Thus, the First
and Second Circuits effectively view standard conditions as im-
plicit in the imposition of supervised release as a policy matter.
The Ninth Circuit appears to justify this view based on judicial
convenience; the Sixth Circuit does so as a matter of statutory
interpretation.
71 United States v Tuloch, 380 F3d 8, 14 n 8 (1st Cir 2004).
72 See United States v Truscello, 168 F3d 61, 63-64 (2d Cir 1999) ("[B]ecause ...
'standard conditions' imposed.., are basic administrative requirement[s] essential to the
functioning of the supervised release system .... they are almost uniformly imposed by
the district courts and have become boilerplate .... [T]he term 'discretionary' may be a
misleading, if technically accurate, modifier for the standard conditions.") (quotation
marks omitted).
73 Napier, 463 F3d at 1043.
74 Swanson, 209 Fed Appx at 524, quoting United States v Crea, 968 F Supp 826, 830
(EDNY 1997). Section 3583(f) reads as follows:
The court shall direct that the probation officer provide the defendant with a
written statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the term of super-
vised release is subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a
guide for the defendant's conduct and for such supervision as is required.
18 USC § 3583(f).
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The First and Second Circuits' arguments are persuasive
with respect to the standard conditions that are administrative 76
or necessary to effectuate supervised release3 This is because it
is likely harmless error for courts to fail to provide reasons for
standard conditions. 77 In the context of supervised release, a sen-
tencing judge's failure to provide a reason for a discretionary con-
dition is harmless when the "consistency of [the] condition with
the statutory sentencing factors is plain."78 These statutory sen-
tencing factors include (1) "protect[ing] the public from further
crimes of the defendant 79 and (2) "provid[ing] the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.s 0 These two
statutory sentencing factors appear consistent with the aforemen-
tioned conditions requiring the defendant to communicate with
his probation officer, work or attend school, and notify relevant
third parties of his public-safety risk. Thus, the First and Second
Circuits are justified in treating these conditions as implicit in the
imposition of supervised release.
But other standard conditions are neither administrative in
nature nor necessarily required for supervised release. For exam-
ple, § 5D1.3(c)(7)-(9) of the Sentencing Guidelines restricts the
places a defendant can visit, the individuals with whom a defend-
ant can interact, and a defendant's alcohol consumption.81 Ulti-
mately, the reasoning of these four circuit courts is troubling be-
cause § 3583(d) requires a case-by-case assessment of non-
administrative standard conditions. For some defendants, these
75 See text accompanying notes 45-47.
76 See text accompanying notes 48-49.
77 The Seventh Circuit appears to have accepted this reasoning. In Kappes, the Sev-
enth Circuit ruled that it constitutes harmless error for a sentencing judge to fail to justify
standard conditions requiring defendants to (1) notify their probation officers if they have
been arrested or questioned by police while on supervised release and (2) not act as in-
formants for criminal investigations without receiving court permission. Kappes, 782 F3d
at 850-51. Regarding the former condition, the court explained that "[clearly, this condi-
tion assists the probation officer in monitoring the defendant's conduct and compliance
with the other conditions of release, most notably, the mandatory condition that the de-
fendant commit no other criminal offenses." Id at 850. The court then reasoned that the
latter condition advances the "the rehabilitative and re-integrative goals of supervision."
Id at 851 (quotation marks omitted). There remains a circuit split because the Seventh
Circuit has not budged from its position that judges are statutorily required to provide
reasons for all discretionary conditions imposed. See text accompanying notes 65-67.
78 Siegel, 753 F3d at 713.
79 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(C).
80 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Sl USSG § 5D1.3(c)(7)-(9).
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standard conditions may not be reasonably related to any of the
applicable sentencing factors in § 3553(a) and could involve a
greater deprivation of liberty than is permissible.82 For a defend-
ant whose crimes justify more-restrictive standard conditions, the
harmless-error doctrine would effectively nullify § 3553(c)-a re-
sult that is impermissible as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.83 Thus, the harmless-error doctrine should apply only to
standard conditions that are administrative in nature or neces-
sary to effectuate the goals of supervised release. Such standard
conditions are applicable across all cases and do not demand in-
dividualized analyses.
These four circuit courts' reasoning also seems flawed in
practice. By allowing standard conditions to be implicit in the im-
position of supervised release, these courts have complicated sen-
tencing judges' legal obligation under § 3553(c) to provide reasons
for imposing standard conditions. If a sentencing judge implicitly
imposes standard conditions after a sentencing hearing, it seems
unlikely that he would have provided reasons for all of them at
the sentencing hearing. It thus appears that these four circuits
have created a rule that enables a sentencing judge to violate
§ 3553(c) by not providing reasons for standard conditions.
As compared to these circuits, the Seventh Circuit's approach
diverges and adopts a more effective way for courts to impose non-
administrative standard conditions. The Seventh Circuit has
ruled that standard conditions imposed through written
judgment-and-commitment orders but not announced orally at
sentencing lack legal authority when the following two conditions
are fulfilled: (1) other discretionary conditions are explicitly an-
nounced at sentencing, and (2) there is an "inconsistency" between
the conditions orally announced and written on judgment-and-
commitment orders.84 The Seventh Circuit has used "incon-
sistency" to characterize additional discretionary conditions or
provisions that substantively expand the scope of the defendant's
82 See, for example, Kappes, 782 F3d at 849 (finding error in the court's failure to
provide a reason for the standard condition restricting the defendant's alcohol con-
sumption, because the condition was not connected to the defendant's child pornogra-
phy offenses).
83 See Montclair v Ramsdell, 107 US (17 Otto) 147, 152 (1883) ("It is the duty of the
court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U Chi L Rev 800, 815
(1983) ("[L]egislators would rather not have the courts nullify their effort entirely unless the
interpretation necessary to save it would pervert the goals of the legislature in enacting it.").
84 Johnson, 765 F3d at 710-11. See also Kappes, 782 F3d at 862.
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supervision.85 Under this definition of "inconsistency," sentencing
judges within the Seventh Circuit cannot impose conditions via
judgment-and-commitment orders that the judges do not explain
at sentencing.
The Seventh Circuit's approach is persuasive because Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c) unambiguously defines
"sentencing" as "the oral announcement of the sentence."86 This
means that "[aill components of a sentence must be stated in the
oral sentence."87 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's approach side-
steps the pitfalls for noncompliance with § 3553(a) and (c) that
are posed by the majority rule. The Seventh Circuit rule avoids
creating opportunities for judges either to fail to provide reasons
for nonadministrative standard conditions or, more importantly,
to fail to independently weigh nonadministrative standard condi-
tions. Ultimately, the disagreement among these circuits creates
differences in how sentencing judges impose standard conditions
but does not change the fundamental explanatory requirement of
§ 3553(c).
D. Form AO-245B
As noted by other commentators, there is reason to believe
that some sentencing judges regularly fail to comply with the ex-
planatory requirement when imposing standard conditions.88 A
significant reason for this noncompliance appears to be that the
judgment-and-commitment form issued by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States to district courts lists the first thirteen
standard conditions as preprinted boilerplate text.8 9 According to
85 See Johnson, 765 F3d at 711 ("[The district court unambiguously announced sev-
eral specific conditions of supervised release at Johnson's sentencing hearing and did not
include any statement as to whether other standard conditions would apply.... [A]ny new
conditions imposed in the later written judgment are inconsistent with the court's oral
order and must be vacated."); Kappes, 782 F3d at 863 (ruling that the addition of a
discretionary-condition provision allowing the defendant's probation officer to examine the
defendant's computer for child pornography was a "nullity" because the judge limited this
condition to on-site examination and replication of digital files at sentencing).
86 FRCrP 35(c). See also McMillian, 777 F3d at 451.
87 McMillian, 777 F3d at 451.
88 See note 15.
89 See Judgment in a Criminal Case *5 (Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Sept 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/F2KG-MDX6 ("Form AO-245B"). See also
E-mail from Charles W. Hall, Public Affairs Office, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, to Michael Kenstowicz (Oct 29, 2014) (on file with author) (stating that
Charles Hall, a spokesperson for the Administrative Office, could not ascertain a reason
why form AO-245B does not include standard conditions 14 and 15 within the "Standard
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the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, this form,
labeled "AO-245B,"9° can be modified by a sentencing judge to re-
move the standard conditions as boilerplate language because
such a decision falls within the judge's sentencing discretion.91 A
sentencing judge can implement this change by directing his staff
to retype sheet three of form AO-245B, following its current for-
matting but omitting the boilerplate standard conditions lan-
guage at the bottom. Indeed, sentencing judges appear to already
direct their staffs to make other changes to form AO-245B to meet
judicial preferences.92
Nevertheless, according to Doherty, "[b]y way of the AO-
245B, people on probation and supervised release are mechani-
cally made subject to exactly the same thirteen standard condi-
tions."93 In this respect, the Judicial Conference has formatted
standard conditions the same way as mandatory supervised re-
lease conditions, which are also written on this form when sen-
tencing judges receive it.94 By contrast, the Judicial Conference
has formatted sheet 3C of form AO-245B to require that judges
write a list of all special conditions imposed on a case-by-case ba-
sis.95 While the Judicial Conference has not explained its
reasoning for this formatting decision, it may have chosen to
use boilerplate language for the standard conditions because
this default is undemanding of judges' time and energy. This
format enables the supervised release system to continue to
function despite the high decision costs associated with
justifying all discretionary conditions of supervised release.
The mechanical nature of this process and the observations of
Judge Posner and Professor Christine Scott-Hayward 96 raise
Conditions of Supervision" but rather incorporates their language in other sections of the
form).
90 See Form AO-245B at *1 (cited in note 89).
91 See E-mail from Hall (cited in note 89) ("All other passages of AO-245B [besides
the Statement of Reasons form] may be modified at the discretion of district courts and
judges, although courts are strongly encouraged to use the AO form, to ensure uniformity
of information and presentation."). The Statement of Reasons form is an attachment to
form AO-245B and is distinct from sheet three of form AO-245B, which contains the boil-
erplate standard conditions language. If sentencing judges removed the boilerplate stand-
ard conditions from their copies of form AO-245, they would still be using the referenced
AO form and could still subscribe to its formatting by writing in the standard conditions
imposed.
92 See notes 126-27.
93 Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 2).
94 See Figure 1. See also USSG § 5D1.3(a) (listing conditions of supervised release).
95 See Form AO-245B at *8 (cited in note 89).
96 See note 15.
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concerns that some sentencing judges are failing to comply with
their statutory obligation to provide reasons for imposing terms
of supervised release.
FIGURE 1. FORM AO-245B, SHEET THREE
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II. JUDICIAL COMPLIANCE WITH 18 USC § 3553(C): AN
EXAMINATION OF JUDGES' IMPOSITION OF DISCRETIONARY
SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS
This Part evaluates whether judges are complying with their
statutory obligation to provide reasons for imposing the first
thirteen standard conditions. This issue recently captured the
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attention of the Seventh Circuit in United States v Siegel.97 In this
case, Judge Posner issued an influentialm8 expos6 on the "serious
problems with how some district judges are handling discretion-
ary conditions of supervised release at sentencing."99 He raised
the concern that "often judges seem not to look behind the recom-
mendations" made by probations officers for imposing supervised
release.100 In response to this concern, he outlined the challenges
that sentencing judges face in giving reasons for discretionary
conditions of supervised release and recommended a series of best
practices to help judges overcome these challenges.lol Thus, Siegel
importantly changed discretionary supervised release conditions
from being "all too often an afterthought1o2 to restrictions that
judges must provide reasons for imposing-a requirement that
the panel explicitly stated three times.103
Given Siegel's importance, this Part compares judicial
compliance with § 3553(c) pre- and post-Siegel. After finding
evidence that sentencing judges have failed to significantly
improve compliance, this Part then explores why appellate
guidance may be ineffective at inducing substantial compliance.
This Part concludes by examining the problems mentioned by
Judge Posner in Siegel that contribute to noncompliance.
However, before beginning these tasks, it is important to first
consider in greater depth the stakes of judicial noncompliance
with § 3553(c).
97 753 F3d 705 (7th Cir 2014).
98 See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial In-
fluence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J Legal Stud 271, 278
(1998). Based on the authors' numbers, the average number of courts of appeals citations
per reported court of appeals opinion per year was 7.36 for judges sitting on the court of
appeals in 1992 who had been on the bench for at least six years by December 31, 1995.
According to Westlaw, Siegel was cited in eighteen reported court of appeals opinions in
the year since it was issued.
99 Siegel, 753 F3d at 708.
100 Id at 711.
101 Id at 716-17 (recommending that probation officers inform defense counsel of their
proposed discretionary conditions two weeks before sentencing hearings, and further in-
structing sentencing judges to independently assess these conditions according to defend-
ants' particular circumstances, to make the language of the conditions simple, and to hold
second sentencing hearings immediately before defendants begin their terms of supervised
release).
102 Jonathan Koenig, What the Seventh Circuit Did during Your Summer Vacation
(Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog), archived at http://perma.cc/3DJC-TF7S.
103 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 707-08, 717.
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A. The Stakes: Why Judicial Compliance with § 3553(c)
Matters When Imposing Discretionary Conditions
A judge's failure to provide reasons for imposing discretion-
ary conditions is problematic because it increases the likelihood
that supervised release will be punitive. As explained in Part I.A,
Congress mandated that supervised release not be punitive. How-
ever, supervised release becomes punitive when judges impose
conditions that do not advance public-safety or rehabilitative
goals. If defendants comply with such conditions, courts will have
effectively restricted defendants' personal freedoms beyond the
extent allowable by Congress. If defendants do not comply with
such conditions, courts will have imposed on defendants a risk of
possible future punishment for noncompliance. Thus, the explan-
atory requirement serves as a valuable check by ensuring that
sentencing judges independently evaluate the appropriateness of
the discretionary conditions imposed. 104
The case of United States v Caldwell °5 illustrates the concern
that supervised release may become punitive due to judicial non-
compliance with § 3553(c). In this case, the sentencing judge im-
posed a term of supervised release on a defendant convicted of
violating the Clean Water Act for illegally dumping septage into
a sewage system and for making false statements to investigators
to cover up this fraudulent scheme.106 The sentencing judge im-
posed "all of the standard conditions" but did not provide any rea-
sons for imposing them.O Since neither the sentencing judge, nor
the probation officer, mentioned any substance abuse history,108 it
appears likely that the following standard conditions lacked re-
habilitative value for Caldwell and would have failed to improve
public safety: "the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of
104 See, for example, United States v Goodwin, 717 F3d 511, 524 (7th Cir 2013) (va-
cating a discretionary condition of supervised release "[b]ecause the district court [had]
not provided any explanation of how this condition [was] reasonably related to Goodwin's
offense and background or to the goals of punishment, involving no greater deprivation of
liberty than [was] reasonably necessary to achieve these goals").
105 Judgment in Criminal Case, Criminal Action No 13-05308 (WD Wash filed Apr 14,
2014) ("Caldwell Judgment and Commitment Order").
106 Id at *1, 3.
107 Transcript of Sentencing, United States v Caldwell, Criminal Action No 13-05308,
*53-57 (WD Wash filed June 18, 2014).
108 See generally id.
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alcohol"'109 and "shall not frequent places where controlled sub-
stances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered.""10
This case appears especially troubling because the sentencing
judge handwrote changes to the typed special conditions language
on this form but left the boilerplate standard conditions language
untouched."' If the sentencing judge had given the standard con-
ditions the statutorily required level of consideration, it seems un-
likely that these two conditions would have been imposed.
Even if Caldwell had a history of substance abuse that justi-
fied these conditions, the sentencing judge's failure to provide rea-
sons for them may undercut defendants' confidence in the just-
ness of federal sentencing. The Sentencing Commission views
supervised release as involving a relationship of trust between
the defendant and the court.112 According to this view, if a defend-
ant violates a discretionary condition, he breaches the court's
trust.113 By giving reasons for imposing supervised release, sen-
tencing judges can help build this relationship of trust and can
preserve the reasoning for their sentences for appellate review. 114
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has explained that the explan-
atory requirement helpfully "promote[s] the perception of fair
sentencing[ ] and [ ] is a vital element in [ensuring] ... that the
sentencing judge... consider[s] every convicted person as an in-
dividual." 115 Thus, justice for individual defendants and the
maintenance of public confidence in federal sentencing practices
each demand that sentencing judges provide reasons for imposing
discretionary conditions of supervised release.
B. A Look at Judicial Compliance with § 3553(c)
In order to assess Siegel's concern that some sentencing
judges may regularly fail to comply with § 3553(c), this Comment
compares judicial compliance with this explanatory requirement
before and after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Siegel.
109 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(7).
110 USSG § 5D1.3(c)(8).
111 See Caldwell Judgment and Commitment Order at *3-4 (cited in note 105).
112 See USSG § 7A.3(b).
113 See USSG § 7A.3(b). See also Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson, and Gregory Barr,
The Attrition of Rights under Parole, 87 S Cal L Rev 887, 899-900 (2014).
114 See United States v Kappes, 782 F3d 828, 845 (7th Cir 2015) (identifying one pur-
pose of the explanatory requirement as "allow[ing] for meaningful appellate review") (quo-
tation marks omitted).
115 Id (quotation marks omitted).
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Because the Seventh Circuit decided Siegel, this Comment fo-
cuses on the judicial behavior of district judges within this circuit.
Compared to district judges in other circuits, those within the
Seventh Circuit are more likely to be aware of Siegel and, more
importantly, are bound by it. It is reasonable to believe that this
subset of district court judges would be most likely to comply with
§ 3553(c) post-Siegel when imposing discretionary conditions due
to the Seventh Circuit's compulsory appellate guidance on super-
vised release and based on the court's signal that it would be will-
ing to remand cases for noncompliance.116
This Comment focuses on the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois because it has the largest per-
centage of the Seventh Circuit's criminal docket of all district
courts in that jurisdiction.17 Because the Seventh Circuit issued
Siegel on May 29, 2014, this Comment allots a three-week window
for district judges in this circuit to become informed of Siegel's
dictates. Data was therefore collected on these district judges' im-
positions of supervised release during the period between
June 19, 2014, and July 18, 2014 (hereinafter called "post-
Siegel"). In order to create a point for comparison, the same data
was gathered for the period beginning on June 19, 2013, continu-
ing through July 18, 2013 (hereinafter called "pre-Siegel"). Since
Siegel came "[s]eemingly out of the blue,"118 there is no reason to
believe that district courts anticipated it during the summer of
2013. Thus, this project was designed to create a relatively com-
parable sample of cases decided by the same group of district
court judges during the same calendar period and thereby at-
tempts to eliminate the influence of selection effects." 9
116 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 717 ("[Tlhe cases must be remanded for reconsideration of
the conditions of supervised release that we have determined to be .. .imposed without
the sentencing judge's having justified them by reference to the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).").
117 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table 5.2-US District
Courts-Criminal Judicial Facts and Figures (Sept 30, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/QXB9-BX5C.
118 Koenig, What the Seventh Circuit Did during Your Summer Vacation (cited in note
102). See also Douglas A. Berman and Robert J. Watkins, Terrific Posnerian Disquisition
on Supervised Release Challenges and "Best Practices" (Sentencing Law and Policy Blog,
May 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XJ3Q-ZKZF (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
Siegel opinion and calling it a "must-read for all who work" in federal criminal law).
119 A one-month period was chosen for this project because the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois has a ninety-day redaction period for transcripts
and this project commenced in the fall of 2014.
20151 1431
1432 The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1411
Due to the costs of obtaining publicly unavailable transcripts
of these sentencing hearings,120 sixteen transcripts were obtained
for the pre-Siegel period and twenty-three were obtained for the
post-Siegel period. Although a set of thirty-nine transcripts pro-
vides only limited statistical power to measure the effect of Siegel,
criticism of this data set's size is diminished by this Comment's
focus on the judges most likely to comply with § 3553(c) and by
this project's review of all ninety-three judgment-and-
commitment orders for this set of sentencing hearings. This Com-
ment thus provides insight into judicial compliance with
§ 3553(c).
1. Transcript data.
Sentencing judges imposed standard conditions in thirty-
eight of the thirty-nine supervised release terms in this data
set.121 Among these thirty-eight cases, the sentencing judges com-
plied with § 3553(c) by giving reasons for all of the standard con-
ditions imposed in only three cases. 122 In nine other cases, the sen-
tencing judges provided reasons for some but not all of the
120 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois charges a
minimum of $3.65 per page for sentencing hearings that have not been transcribed. See
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Maximum Transcript
Rates - All Parties (per Page) (Jan 26, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/CH4X-NULP. In
order to make this project financially feasible, only the sentencing excerpts from hearings
were purchased. Court reporters have discretion to transcribe such hearings. They tran-
scribed twenty-two of seventy-six requested sentencing hearing excerpts for this project,
and Bloomberg Law provided seventeen publicly accessible full transcripts for sentencing
hearings within this period.
121 In the other term, the sentencing judge imposed special conditions, but the tran-
script excerpt indicates that he did not impose any standard conditions. Compare Judg-
ment in a Criminal Case, United States v Kirk, Criminal Action No 08-00036, *3 (ND Ill
filed July 16, 2014), with Excerpt Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United States v
Kirk, Criminal Action No 08-00036, *4 (ND III July 16, 2014) ("Kirk Excerpt Transcript").
122 See, for example, Transcript of Proceedings - Sentencing, United States v
Chatman, Criminal Action No 12-00877, *33 (ND Ill filed July 29, 2014) ("Chatman
Transcript"):
You shall participate in an approved job training program at the discretion of
the probation officer, because I have no record of documented work history in
the [presentence report] .... I am going to require that you undergo a mental
health evaluation and participate in treatment regarding domestic violence if
necessary ... because of the domestic violence conviction in the past and the
escalation of behavior.
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standard conditions imposed. But in twenty-six cases, the sen-
tencing judges failed to provide reasons for any of the standard
conditions imposed.123
In comparing compliance with § 3553(c) pre- and post-Siegel,
sentencing judges gave reasons for imposing standard and special
conditions in a higher percentage of terms post-Siegel, but these
differences are not statistically significant. Compliance remained
low post-Siegel. For standard conditions, sentencing judges in-
creased their compliance with § 3553(c) from 0 percent to roughly
13 percent. Pre-Siegel, sentencing judges gave reasons for all of
the special conditions imposed in approximately 14 percent of
cases, and this number increased to 29 percent post-Siegel.124 This
data corroborates the Seventh Circuit's concern that sentencing
judges still do not regularly comply with § 3553(c) when imposing
discretionary conditions of supervised release and indicates that
Siegel failed to induce substantial compliance.
123 The publication schedule for this Comment did not allow for harmless-error coding
of the imposition of standard conditions. The Seventh Circuit first identified the failure to
provide reasons for particular standard conditions as harmless error in Kappes, issued on
April 8, 2015, but had not previously taken up this judicial task. See, for example, United
States v Bryant, 754 F3d 443, 445 (7th Cir 2014) (omitting any discussion of harmless error
when the sentencing judge failed to give reasons for imposing thirteen standard condi-
tions). In addressing the failure to give a reason for a special condition, the Seventh Circuit
has previously ruled that such a failure is harmless when the "consistency of [the] condi-
tion with the statutory sentencing factors is plain." Siegel, 753 F3d at 713. Due to space
constraints and the difficulty of empirically coding harmless error for special conditions,
this Comment leaves for future researchers the task of addressing harmless error in rela-
tion to § 3553(c) for discretionary conditions.
124 Sentencing judges imposed special conditions in thirty-five of the thirty-nine terms
in this data set and gave reasons for imposing special conditions in eight of the thirty-five
terms (22,9 percent). Two of these eight terms were pre-Siegel and the other six terms
were post-Siegel. Thus, the compliance with § 3553(c) increased from 14.3 percent pre-
Siegel (compliance in two of fourteen terms) to 28.6 percent post-Siegel (compliance in six
of twenty-one terms), but this change is not statistically significant based on a Fisher's
exact test with a 0.10 significance level (the p-value is 0.43, which is not significant at
p < 0.10).
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TABLE 1. THE EFFECT OF SIEGEL ON JUDICIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH § 3553(C) WHEN IMPOSING STANDARD CONDITIONS
Transcript Data Set Pre-Siegel Post-Siegel
Number of Supervised Release Terms in 15 23
Which Standard Conditions Were
Imposed
Number of Supervised Release Terms in 0 3
Which the Judge Provided Reasons for All (0%) (13.0%)125
Standard Conditions Imposed
Number of Supervised Release Terms in 6 3
Which the Judge Provided Reasons for (40.0%) (13.0%)
Some Standard Conditions Imposed
Number of Supervised Release Terms in 9 17
Which the Judge Provided No Reasons for (60.0%) (73.9%)
the Standard Conditions Imposed
An interesting correlation emerges from these results be-
tween the imposition of standard conditions and compliance with
the requirement that judges provide reasons for imposing those
conditions. There were only three cases in which the sentencing
judges did not impose all thirteen boilerplate standard conditions
from form AO-245B and instead imposed particular standard con-
ditions tailored to the defendants' situations.126 These three cases
were also the only ones in which the sentencing judges gave rea-
sons for all of the standard conditions imposed.127 This observa-
tion is unsurprising for two reasons. First, if the sentencing judge
125 A Fisher's exact test was performed with a 0.10 significance level for standard
conditions. The p-value is 0.26, which is not significant atp < 0.10.
126 See Chatman Transcript at *31-34 (cited in note 122); Transcript of Proceedings -
Sentencing, United States v Charleston-Black, Criminal Action No 12-00019, *45-49 (ND
Ill filed Aug 6, 2014) ("Charleston-Black Transcript"); Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings -
Sentencing, United States v Harris, Criminal Action No 13-00275, *11-13 (ND Ill July 10,
2014) ("Harris Excerpt Transcript"). The date that the court filed the transcript does not
necessarily correlate with the date of the transcribed proceedings, as in Charleston-Black.
In this case, the court filed the transcript on August 6, 2014, but the proceedings occurred
on June 23, 2014.
127 See Chatman Transcript at *31-34 (cited in note 122); Charleston-Black Tran-
script at *37-40, 42 (cited in note 126); Harris Excerpt Transcript at *11-13 (cited in
note 126).
1434 [82:1411
Nudging Judges to Follow the Law
took time to tailor the standard conditions imposed to the defend-
ant's situation, then the judge would be more likely to exercise
meticulous care in justifying the conditions imposed. Second, if
the sentencing judge imposed fewer than all thirteen boilerplate
conditions, then it would be easier for the judge to justify them
because there would be fewer reasons to provide during the sen-
tencing hearing.128
2. Data for judgment-and-commitment forms.
Although supervised release conditions announced at sen-
tencing are authoritative, 129 the apparent correlation between the
imposition of boilerplate standard conditions and noncompliance
with § 3553(c) suggests that judgment-and-commitment forms
warrant attention. A review of the forms included in this Com-
ment's data set revealed that even for the three terms in which
the sentencing judge did not impose all thirteen boilerplate stand-
ard conditions at sentencing, the forms for these three terms in-
cluded all thirteen boilerplate standard conditions.130 As ex-
plained in Part I.C, the additional standard conditions on these
forms were not binding, because the sentencing judge declined to
impose them orally at the sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, the
fact that these three judgment-and-commitment forms contain
unissued standard conditions signals the inertia of form AO-
245B's format.
Among the ninety-three judgment-and-commitment orders in
this data set, there exists only one variation: the language of the
second standard condition on twelve judgment-and-commitment
forms was changed from "the defendant shall report to the proba-
tion officer in a manner and frequency directed by the court or
probation officer131 to "the defendant shall report to the probation
officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report
within the first five days of each month."'1 2 The distribution of this
variation in the language of the second standard condition
128 See Part III.A.2.
129 See text accompanying note 84.
130 See Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Harris, Criminal Action No 13-
00275, *3 (ND Ill filed July 17, 2014) ("Harris Judgment and Commitment Order"); Judg-
ment in a Criminal Case, United States v Chatman, Criminal Action No 12-00877, *3 (ND
Ill filed June 30, 2014); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Charleston-Black,
Criminal Action No 12-00019, *3 (ND Ill filed June 25, 2014).
131 Form AO-245B at *5 (cited in note 89).
132 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Abate, Criminal Action No 12-
00568, *3 (ND Ill filed June 23, 2014) ("Abate Judgment and Commitment Order").
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pre- and post-Siegel was not statistically significant.133 The statis-
tical insignificance of this variation in the language of the second
standard condition is reinforced by the fact that no sentencing
judge in this sample issued orders containing the altered lan-
guage of the second standard condition post-Siegel if he did not
already use this altered language pre-Siegel. This fact is im-
portant because it indicates that no sentencing judge altered the
boilerplate standard conditions language on form AO-245B in re-
sponse to Siegel. Besides this variation, all ninety-three orders
contain the verbatim language of standard conditions one and
three through thirteen in the format of form AO-245B issued by
the Judicial Conference. This uniformity indicates that, post-
Siegel, sentencing judges did not perceive a connection between
their statutory obligation to provide reasons for the standard con-
ditions imposed and their formal imposition of these conditions
via written judgment-and-commitment orders.
3. Qualitative evidence of noncompliance with § 3553(c).
Given this quantitative data, this Comment's qualitative
findings signal that, even post-Siegel, some sentencing judges
may not recognize when they fail to comply with § 3553(c) in im-
posing discretionary conditions of supervised release. For exam-
ple, in United States v Kirk,134 the sentencing judge did not pro-
vide reasons for imposing standard conditions of supervised
release but instead said: "Well, the standard conditions-I know
that there's been some law on this recently, but I think in this
case, we don't have to worry about it. The standard conditions,
remind me, do they require that the defendant stay in the North-
ern District?"'135 Another sentencing judge initially decided not to
impose supervised release but then imposed a term without
providing reasons for doing so after the probation officer errone-
ously instructed the judge that he "ha[d] to give him supervised
133 For this Comment's data set, sentencing judges increased their use of the altered
language of the second standard condition from thirty-eight of forty-six cases (82.6 per-
cent) pre-Siegel to forty-three of forty-seven cases (91.5 percent) post-Siegel. A Fisher's
exact test was performed with a 0.10 significance level and a two-tailed hypothesis. For
the second standard condition, the p-value is 0.23, which is not significant at p < 0.10.
134 Excerpt Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, Criminal Action No 08-00036 (ND
Ill July 16, 2014).
135 Id at *4.
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release."136 If the sentencing judge knew of the requirement to pro-
vide reasons for imposing supervised release, he presumably
would have explained why he changed his decision.
A third sentencing judge imposed "the standard written con-
ditions" on a defendant convicted of illegally reentering the
United States after being deported but did not explain why he
imposed them.137 This judge's decision to impose standard condi-
tions despite his expectation that the defendant would be de-
ported may reflect unfamiliarity with § 3553(c). 138 If the judge had
been familiar with § 3553(c), he probably would not have imposed
several seemingly unjustifiable standard conditions. Because the
defendant was an illegal alien, there would have been no way for
him to "work regularly at a lawful occupation."139 Furthermore,
given the strong likelihood that the defendant would be deported,
the defendant seemingly could not comply with the requirement
that he "not leave the judicial district without the permission of
the court or probation officer."140 These qualitative findings sug-
gest that some sentencing judges may not realize their noncom-
pliance with § 3553(c) when imposing discretionary conditions of
supervised release.
136 Transcript of Proceedings - Sentencing, United States v West, Criminal Action No
11-00061, *23 (ND Ill filed July 31, 2014) ("West Transcript") (initially deciding "not... to
impose supervised release" but later imposing a term of supervised release when a proba-
tion officer told the sentencing judge that he "ha[d] to give him supervised release" after
the defendant was convicted under 18 USC § 922(g)(1)). But see 18 USC § 924(e)(1) (stating
that mandatory terms of supervised release are not required for felons convicted of pos-
session of firearms under 18 USC § 922(g)).
137 Excerpt of Proceedings, United States v Campos-Guzman, Criminal Action No 13-
50052, *2 (ND Ill June 23, 2014).
138 See id.
139 Form AO-245B at *5 (cited in note 89).
140 Id. Among the ninety-three defendants in this project's data set, four received su-
pervised release terms for illegally reentering the United States. The Sentencing Guide-
lines recommend that "[t]he court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised re-
lease in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is
a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment." USSG § 5D 1. 1(c). The
judgment-and-commitment orders for these cases do not list convictions for crimes that
require the imposition of supervised release. Even more puzzling, for three of these super-
vised release terms, the sentencing judges imposed a special condition requiring that the
defendant remain outside the United States if deported and that he not reenter the United
States without obtaining express permission from the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. See, for example, Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Cam-
pos-Guzman, Criminal Action No 13-50052, *4 (ND Ill filed June 23, 2014). This special
condition appears to be in significant tension with the Sentencing Guidelines' recommen-
dation because this condition takes effect only if the defendant is deported.
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C. Why Would Sentencing Judges Fail to Comply with
§ 3553(c)?
As sentencing judges failed to provide reasons for all
standard and special conditions in more than 77 percent of
supervised release terms post-Siegel, this statistic suggests that
the problem of judicial noncompliance with § 3553(c) for
discretionary conditions is particularly sticky.141 As discussed
above, the format of form AO-245B likely contributes to this
problem. By keeping the thirteen standard conditions as
boilerplate language on judgment-and-commitment orders, some
sentencing judges appear to be imposing the standard conditions
without deciding which particular ones should be imposed.142 This
inference creates concern that sentencing judges are violating
§ 3553(a) and (c) by not actively choosing to impose all thirteen
boilerplate standard conditions and are instead merely following
the dictates of form AO-245B.
Several other issues also likely contribute to sentencing
judges' failure to give reasons for imposing standard conditions:
(1) the timing for imposing conditions of supervised release;
(2) some judges' reflexive deference to the recommendations of
probation officers; (3) the number of discretionary conditions that
the Sentencing Commission recommends; and (4) the apparent
ineffectiveness of appellate guidance to remedy judicial
noncompliance with the explanatory requirement. Each of these
four issues will be examined in turn.
1. Timing for imposing conditions of supervised release.
Since courts impose the terms of supervised release at sen-
tencing, "the judge has to guess what conditions are likely to
make sense when the defendant is released."143 By making the
thirteen standard conditions the default, judges lower their deci-
sion costs for imposing discretionary conditions. These decision
costs are relatively high in some circumstances because judges
must predict defendants' relative threats to public safety and
141 This conclusion is consistent with the findings of literature on default rules. See,
for example, Omri Ben-Shahar and John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 Fla St U L Rev 651, 682 (2006) (concluding that "[diefault rules and the standard boil-
erplate terms may stick more than we think, and more than they should").
142 This practice occurred in twenty-four terms (63.2 percent) of this Comment's
sample in which judges imposed standard conditions.
143 Siegel, 753 F3d at 708.
[82:14111438
2015] Nudging Judges to Follow the Law 1439
future rehabilitation needs that are years away. It can be partic-
ularly challenging for a sentencing judge to evaluate the likeli-
hood of recidivism for individual defendants. Although there is a
significant body of literature on recidivism,144 "statistical studies
are unlikely to enable a confident prediction that a particular in-
mate will or will not commit crimes after he is released."'145
To address this issue, several commentators have suggested
that judges reconsider supervised release conditions just before a
prisoner is released from prison.146 This suggestion is based on the
statutory provision that supervised release conditions can be al-
tered after being imposed.147 Nonetheless, this proposal is burden-
some to judges because of the costs associated with holding second
sentencing hearings.14s Additionally, it fails to remedy the funda-
mental problem: that supervised release requires judges to pre-
dict the appropriate discretionary conditions at sentencing. One
sentencing judge described this situation as "being [a] more diffi-
cult [position] than that of King Solomon" and lamented the lack
of a "crystal ball."149 It is thus understandable that some sentenc-
ing judges might fail to give reasons for such conditions: they
might be choosing to avoid an unenviable task.150
144 See generally, for example, Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson, and Daniel S.
Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 Prison J
Supp 48S (2011); Cassia Spohn and David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recid-
ivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 Crimin 329 (2002) (finding
no evidence that imprisonment reduces the likelihood of recidivism).
145 Siegel, 753 F3d at 709. Judge Posner further explained that "academic studies of
recidivism are unfamiliar to most judges and often difficult for a judge who lacks a social-
scientific background to evaluate." Id at 710.
146 See, for example, Scott-Hayward, 18 Berkeley J Crim L at 222 (cited in note 6);
Siegel, 753 F3d at 717.
147 18 USC § 3583(e)(2) (stating that the court "may modify, reduce, or enlarge the
conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the
term of supervised release").
148 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 708 ("[While it's true that conditions of supervised release
can be modified at any time, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), modification is a bother for the judge,
especially when ... modification becomes the responsibility of the sentencing judge's suc-
cessor because the sentencing judge has retired in the meantime.").
149 Excerpt Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United States v Jackson, Criminal
Action No 11-00747, *26-27 (ND Ill July 15, 2013) ("Jackson Excerpt Transcript"). The
Seventh Circuit has expressed a similar exasperation regarding the difficulties in deter-
mining the proper discretionary conditions to impose at sentencing. See Kappes, 782 F3d
at 838 ("A defendant may change substantially during a long prison sentence, and the
world outside the prison walls may change even more. A judgeship does not come equipped
with a crystal ball.").
150 See Transcript of Proceedings - Sentencing Hearing, United States v Daniel, Crim-
inal Action No 11-00743, *125 (ND Ill filed Aug 1, 2013) ("I think a term of supervised
release ... is appropriate in this case, and the reason is I do not know what Mr. Daniel's
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2. Reflexive deference to the recommendations of probation
officers.
An additional concern is that judges accept recommended su-
pervised release conditions from probation officers without scru-
tinizing the appropriateness of these conditions for particular de-
fendants.'15 For example, in two cases from the transcript sample,
judges accepted the probation officers' recommendations that
standard conditions of supervised release be imposed without fur-
ther questioning and without providing reasons for imposing
them.152 Generalist judges might defer to probation officers for
two reasons. First, probation officers have expertise with super-
vised release. Second, they are likely to be more knowledgeable
than judges of defendants' needs and circumstances after com-
pleting presentence reports. 53 Given the difficulty of imposing
discretionary conditions, it is rational for judges to rely heavily on
the advice of probation officers. This reliance becomes contrary to
law only when it results in judges' failure to independently weigh
these conditions or provide reasons for the discretionary condi-
tions of supervised release recommended by probation officers.
Another situation presents an opportunity for sentencing
judges to sidestep their judicial obligation under § 3553(a) and (c).
When the parties agree on appropriate discretionary conditions,
the sentencing judge leaves the customary adversarial setting
and must assume an unfamiliar position: "imitating a
Continental-style investigating magistrate."'154 This circumstance
creates an opportunity for sentencing judges to accept the recom-
mendation of particular discretionary conditions without further
situation will be when he's released."). The judge in Daniel justified the imposition of su-
pervised release by explaining that there would be a higher likelihood that the defendant
would be able to pay restitution if he were under court supervision. At this sentencing
hearing as well as at the hearing in Jackson, the sentencing judges failed to give reasons
for all of the standard and special conditions imposed. See id at *121-28; Jackson Excerpt
Transcript at *26-35 (cited in note 149).
151 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 709-10. See also Freeman v United States, 131 S Ct 2685,
2692 (2011) ("[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and
the prosecutor to agree that a specific sentence is appropriate, but that agreement does
not discharge the district court's independent obligation to exercise its discretion.").
152 See West Transcript at *23 (cited in note 136); Glover Transcript at *32-33 (cited
in note 30).
153 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 710-11 (noting the propriety of giving weight to the rec-
ommendations of the probation officer, but also recognizing the limitations of these
recommendations).
154 Creative Montessori Learning Centers v Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F3d 913, 917 (7th
Cir 2011) (characterizing a judge's position in the context of class action settlements).
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inquiry. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be a significant prob-
lem, as no judges in this data set accepted negotiated conditions
without inquiry, and the Seventh Circuit has characterized this
situation as "aris[ing] rarely.155
3. The number of supervised release conditions that the
Sentencing Commission recommends.
A third obstacle to judicial compliance with § 3553(c) may be
the number of discretionary conditions recommended by the Sen-
tencing Commission. As discussed in Part I.B, the Sentencing
Commission recommends fifteen generally applicable standard
conditions and fifteen special conditions that apply in more lim-
ited circumstances. "The sheer number may induce haste in the
judge's evaluation of the probation service's recommendations
and is doubtless a factor in the frequent failure of judges to apply
the sentencing factors in section 3553(a) to all the recommended
conditions included in the sentence.' 15 The fact that thirteen of
the fifteen standard conditions already appear on form AO-245B
likely compounds this problem. Even though judgment-and-
commitment orders are issued after sentencing hearings, form
AO-245B's boilerplate formatting of standard conditions may fail
to signal to sentencing judges that they did not independently
evaluate the recommended conditions.
4. The apparent ineffectiveness of appellate guidance to
induce judicial compliance with § 3553(c).
A final reason for judicial noncompliance with § 3553(c) is
that courts of appeals may be in a poor position to address this
problem because defendants appeal noncompliance infre-
quently.157 As part of their plea agreements, some defendants
waive their rights to appeal their sentences such that there is no
opportunity for appellate review-a result some sentencing
judges have recognized.158 Even if defendants possess the right to
155 Siegel, 753 F3d at 709.
156 Id at 708. See also, for example, Harris Judgment and Commitment Order at *4
(cited in note 130) (leaving the word "and" as a stand-alone word by stating that "[t]he
defendant shall participate in job skills training while in the Bureau of Prisons. and").
157 See text accompanying notes 12-13. See also, for example, Bryant, 754 F3d at 447
(noting that the defendant did not challenge discretionary conditions for which the sen-
tencing judge failed to provide reasons).
158 See, for example, Transcript of Proceedings - Sentencing, United States v Grinberg,
Criminal Action No 10-00218, *39, 58 (ND III July 10, 2014):
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appeal their sentences, many are unlikely to challenge their
terms of supervised release due to the "high discount rate"'1 9 they
assign to supervised release. This is likely due to the fact that the
terms of supervised release may not begin for many years for de-
fendants who have long prison sentences. Furthermore, some de-
fense attorneys do not contest the failure of the sentencing judge
to provide reasons for the discretionary conditions imposed. 160
Given that courts of appeals have few opportunities to provide ap-
pellate guidance, some sentencing judges may not be clear on
some standard condition provisions6i or their discretionary na-
ture.162 In sum, the appeals process may not be an effective mech-
anism for addressing noncompliance with § 3553(c) due to various
collective action problems involving the incentives and choices of
sentencing judges, defendants, and counsel.
Thus, a combination of factors appears to obstruct judicial
compliance with § 3553(a) and (c) for discretionary conditions. In
many cases, judges seem to lack sufficient information at sentenc-
ing to identify all of the discretionary conditions that should be
imposed or to give reasons for imposing them. Given this problem,
sentencing judges have strong incentives to accept recommenda-
tions from probation officers, counsel, and the Sentencing Com-
mission without further consideration and to thereby impose the
default standard conditions on judgment-and-commitment forms.
So in terms of the conditions, I know that all the appeal rights are waived so this
is not going to go to Judge Posner to find out whether I complied with this, but I
still wanted to have you guys [counsel] take a look at them and tell me if you had
any comments.
159 Siegel, 753 F3d at 711 (quotation marks omitted). See also, for example, West Tran-
script at *26 (cited in note 136) (transcribing a defendant's statement that he cannot "think
that far ahead" to his term of supervised release after being sentenced to a prison term of
fifteen years).
160 See, for example, Bryant, 754 F3d at 445-47.
161 See, for example, Transcript of Proceedings - Sentencing, United States v Davis,
Criminal Action No 12-00850, *67-69 (ND Ill filed July 23, 2014) (imposing a term of su-
pervised release and the "normal terms of probation," which-according to the written
judgment-and-commitment order-included the standard condition prohibiting the exces-
sive use of alcohol, despite a finding that the defendant lacked an "alcohol problem"). Pro-
hibitions on the excessive use of alcohol constitute standard conditions adopted by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See, for example, Abate
Judgment and Commitment Order at *3 (cited in note 132).
162 See Kirk Excerpt Transcript at *4 (cited in note 134) (asking if a standard condi-
tion of supervised release can be waived in the judgment-and-commitment order and stat-
ing: "I'll take a look at the J&C and see if we can just omit ... a standard [condition]").
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Appellate review appears to be a poor mechanism for fixing this
problem because hardly any defendants appeal their sentences on
the grounds that the sentencing judges failed to independently
evaluate or explain the discretionary conditions imposed. This re-
sult means that: (1) sentencing judges have significant incentives
to avoid taking up this very challenging task; (2) courts of appeals
have few opportunities to remind sentencing judges of this statu-
tory obligation; and (3) some sentencing judges may not be aware
of this obligation. Solutions beyond appellate review are therefore
needed.
III. NUDGING SENTENCING JUDGES TO COMPLY WITH 18 USC
§ 3553(c) FOR DISCRETIONARY SUPERVISED RELEASE
CONDITIONS
Given the problems described in Part II.C, the judgment-and-
commitment form presents an attractive target to reduce noncom-
pliance with § 3553(c) for standard supervised release conditions.
This Comment makes two proposals to nudge sentencing judges
toward greater compliance.
First, standard conditions one through thirteen should no
longer appear as boilerplate language on form AO-245B. This
change would force sentencing judges or their law clerks to ac-
tively consider and rewrite the standard conditions imposed on
particular defendants and would provide two benefits: (1) defend-
ants would not be subject to standard supervised release condi-
tions without the active choice of the sentencing judge, and
(2) judges might hesitate to write standard conditions for which
they did not provide reasons at sentencing.
Second, sentencing judges should determine whether to hold
a second sentencing hearing by considering their ability to comply
with § 3553(c) at a defendant's initial sentencing hearing. This
approach would help judges evaluate whether they have suffi-
cient information to give reasons for imposing discretionary con-
ditions and could thereby make supervised release more effective
at achieving its curative purposes. Additionally, this approach
would likely induce greater judicial compliance with judges' stat-
utory obligation to independently assess the discretionary condi-
tions imposed and to give reasons for them. This Part describes
each of these recommendations in greater detail.
2015] 1443
The University of Chicago Law Review
A. Removing the Boilerplate Standard Conditions Language on
Form AO-245B
This Comment recommends that sentencing judges eliminate
the first thirteen standard conditions that appear in boilerplate
language on sheet three of their judgment-and-commitment
orders. Instead, sentencing judges should write any individually
imposed standard conditions on the bottom of sheet three. As
explained in Part I.D, judges have the discretion to make this
change 6 and it would not constitute an extreme practice, as some
sentencing judges have already made alterations to form AO-
245B.164 This recommendation could be implemented by judges
authorizing their staffs to redesign sheet three so that the space
below the heading "Standard Conditions of Supervision"165 is
blank, which would replicate form AO-245B's design of the space
for imposing special conditions.168 Sentencing judges would then
be encouraged to impose only warranted standard conditions by
writing them in this space. This Section proceeds by first
presenting the behavioral psychology research informing this
recommendation. It then describes the recommendation in
greater detail and concludes by considering counterarguments.
163 See note 91.
164 See text accompanying note 132.
165 Form AO-245B at *5 (cited in note 89).
166 See id at *8. See Figure 2 for the proposed new design of this form.
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FIGURE 2. PROPOSED FORMAT OF FORM AO-245B, SHEET THREE
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STANDARD CONDITONS OF SUPERVISION
1. Changing routine behaviors to achieve desired outcomes:
choice architecture and nudges.
Behavioral psychology literature recognizes that the
framework in which an individual confronts a decision can
significantly influence his decision.167 To describe this
phenomenon, Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
developed the idea of "choice architecture"-"the context in which
people make decisions"-which can be manipulated to make
particular decisions more likely.168 Choice architectures can be
167 See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 36-37 (Yale 2008); Craig R.M. McKenzie and Jonathan D.
Nelson, What a Speaker's Choice of Frame Reveals: Reference Points, Frame Selection, and
Framing Effects, 10 Psychonomic Bull & Rev 596, 601-02 (2003).
168 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 3 (cited in note 167).
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changed by adjusting "nudges," influential factors that help shape
human behavior.169 For example, on Chicago's scenic Lake Shore
Drive, the city painted a sequence of lines along the curviest
portion of the highway that become closer together as drivers
approach the most dangerous part of the curve, which naturally
induces drivers to slow down.170 Thus, choice architects can
establish favorable nudges that increase the probability that
people will act in particular ways by identifying significant
environmental factors that affect human behaviors and by
aligning these factors to induce desired behaviors.
Choice architecture can help induce greater deliberation by
actors and is especially important for changing routine
behaviors. 171 Deliberation can facilitate critical thought that gives
actors pause before engaging in habitual behaviors and can
thereby alter actors' perspectives on how particular tasks should
be performed. 172 Such deliberation can be prompted by nudges
that require actors to make choices instead of providing a familiar
default option.'73 Creating nudges that force actors to make
choices is particularly significant when an actor intends to
deviate from routine behaviors but experiences significant time
constraints.174 In circumstances with high decision costs, possible
choice fatigue, or a low probability of undesirable consequences,
laboratory experiments suggest that decisionmakers have a high
likelihood of choosing a default option that allows them to devote
minimal energy to their decisions.175
169 Id at 8.
170 See id at 37-39.
171 See Tilmann Betsch, et al, Oops, I Did It Again-Relapse Errors in Routinized
Decision Making, 93 Org Behav & Hum Dec Processes 62, 72 (2004).
172 See Tilmann Betsch, Klaus Fiedler, and Julia Brinkmann, Behavioral Routines in
Decision Making: The Effects of Novelty in Task Presentation and Time Pressure on Rou-
tine Maintenance and Deviation, 28 Eur J Soc Psychology 861, 875-76 (1998).
173 See Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 86 (cited in note 167).
174 See Betsch, et al, 93 Org Behav & Hum Dec Processes at 70-72 (cited in note 171)
(discussing the effect of time constraints on decisionmaking).
175 See Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 34-39, 83 (cited in note 167); Emir Kamenica,
Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives, 4 Ann Rev Econ 427, 437-38 (2012)
(describing experiments showing "how choice fatigue increases the appeal of default op-
tions"); Paul M. Smeets, Simon Dymond, and Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Instructions, Stimulus
Equivalence, and Stimulus Sorting: Effects of Sequential Testing Arrangements and a De-
fault Option, 50 Psychological Rec 339, 350-52 (2000) (explaining that the introduction of a
default option allowing test participants to skip problems that they found "impossible-to-
solve" resulted in most participants skipping or answering incorrectly assigned matching
problems).
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The following study aptly illustrates the impact of opt-in and
opt-out choice architectures on human behavior.76 Researchers
examined the effect of changing enrollment in 401(k) savings
plans from opt-in to opt-out procedures at a large company in the
health insurance industry. 177 Researchers found that 49 percent
more employees participated in 401(k) savings plans when
subjected to the opt-out procedure in comparison to employees of
the same tenure cohort that were subjected to the opt-in
procedure.178 The researchers suggested that this drastic
behavioral difference may result from individuals' preference for
the default option when faced with a complicated decision and the
significant effect of choice architecture on human
decisionmaking. 179 Ultimately, the researchers interpreted this
finding as a signal that "economically significant changes in
savings behavior can be motivated simply by the 'power of
suggestion.'" 180
2. How sentencing judges can use choice architecture and
nudge theory to achieve routine compliance with
§ 3553(a) and (c) for standard conditions.
Eliminating the standard conditions as boilerplate language
on form AO-245B will likely nudge judges to be more deliberative
in considering the value of particular standard conditions to an
individual defendant's situation. If forced to write the standard
conditions imposed on a case-by-case basis, it seems less likely
that conditions lacking in public safety and rehabilitative value
will be imposed, because judges will have to actively choose which
conditions to impose. The current format of sheet three hinders
judicial compliance with § 3553(c) because this format compounds
incentives for judges not to provide reasons for imposing standard
conditions. By the time that the sentencing judge reaches the
discretionary-conditions portion of a defendant's sentence, the
judge has reached one of his last sentencing decisions and
confronts a difficult decision that likely entails a very low
176 See generally Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q J Econ 1149 (2001).
177 Id at 1151-52.
178 Id at 1159-60.
179 See id at 1179-82 (positing that the "endowment effect," "procrastination," and
"anchoring" of a decision reference point impacted the different 401(k) plan participation
rates).
180 Madrian and Shea, 116 Q J Econ at 1184 (cited in note 176).
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probability of reversal.181 Given these difficult circumstances, the
boilerplate nature of the standard conditions language effectively
creates an attractive "implicit endorsement"182 from the Judicial
Conference to impose the first thirteen standard conditions and
move on.
This situation thus calls for a nudge that aligns the default
of form AO-245B with § 3553(c) by making sentencing judges give
reasons for the standard conditions that they impose. This
Comment's suggested formatting change would "force the
choosers to make their own choice"183 by preventing judges from
imposing the first thirteen standard conditions without
evaluating which ones are appropriate to impose. As a result of
this change, judges would not be able to rely on the boilerplate
language as a low-cost default. Instead, judges would be nudged
to engage in deliberation over which standard conditions should
be imposed and possibly to consider which conditions they lack
sufficient information to justify.
Several possible critiques of this proposal come to mind.
First, a critic might claim that removing the standard conditions
in boilerplate language will not make a significant difference in
sentencing judges' explanations for or impositions of standard
conditions and will therefore unnecessarily increase decision
costs in sentencing. This critique is bolstered by this Comment's
finding that sentencing judges failed to comply with the explana-
tory requirement when imposing special conditions of supervised
release in roughly 77 percent of cases.184 Since the practice of
writing special conditions has not resulted in significant
compliance with § 3553(c), this Comment's proposal that sentenc-
ing judges write out standard conditions may therefore seem
unlikely to improve judges' compliance with § 3553(c) for
standard conditions.
In response to this critique, the increased decision costs con-
stitute the burden of legally complying with § 3553(a) by making
independent judgments of the appropriateness of recommended
conditions. The increase in decision costs should not be overly
burdensome, because judges can still easily consider the imposi-
tion of standard conditions by referring to the list in USSG
§ 5D1.3(c). More importantly, behavioral psychology research
181 See Part II.C.4.
182 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 35 (cited in note 167).
183 Id at 86.
184 See Part II.C.
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suggests that changing the boilerplate language on the form
would facilitate judicial compliance with the statutory require-
ment to independently weigh the standard conditions imposed.
Even if some judges develop a habit of writing "all standard con-
ditions apply," they will have engaged in some deliberation before
initially establishing this routine and will have the opportunity
to deviate when completing each new judgment-and-commitment
order. Changing the boilerplate language might thus alter sen-
tencing judges' path dependence in imposing standard conditions.
At the very least, if this change were made, it would be un-
likely that the thirteen boilerplate standard conditions would be
imposed in almost all supervised release terms, as they are now.
As described in Part II.B, the only terms of supervised release in
which sentencing judges complied with § 3553(c) were those in
which the sentencing judge did not impose all thirteen boilerplate
standard conditions. While by no means a panacea, it seems likely
that this change would improve compliance, which this Com-
ment's data support. Sentencing judges complied with § 3553(c)
for special conditions in roughly 15 percent more terms than they
did for standard conditions.185 Given the severity of this problem
and the low costs associated with this suggestion, this proposal
constitutes a worthwhile change for sentencing judges to try.
A second critique of this proposal is that it would be more
efficient to place "yes" and "no" boxes next to each standard con-
dition on sheet three of form AO-245B instead of forcing sentenc-
ing judges to write standard conditions longhand. This task, how-
ever, is valuable because it gives judges greater opportunity to
adjust the language of standard conditions to tailor it to defend-
ants' situations and make the language more precise than if boxes
were merely checked.186 There is a much larger choice set for a
sentencing judge who imposes standard conditions by writing
them out than by checking boxes. Furthermore, checking boxes
sometimes fails to stimulate thoughtful decisionmaking. In one
case reviewed when creating this Comment's sample, a judge
185 Compare Table 1, with note 124.
186 See, for example, United States v Baker, 755 F3d 515, 524 (7th Cir 2014) (acknowl-
edging that the defendant should not have to abstain from all alcohol, but also noting that
requiring the defendant to refrain from excessive use of alcohol was too vague a condition
to impose). See also A.V. Muthukrishnan and Robin Chark, Choice Set Induced Conflict,
Deliberation, and Persistent Preference *10 (Springer Science+Business Media, Jan 7,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/G9HW-CEHJ ("[Wihen people are asked to deliberate
before making their decisions, the degree of persistence [for a particular preference] de-
pends on the degree of conflict induced by the choice sets.").
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checked two boxes to impose a mandatory condition and a special
condition of supervised release, despite ordering that the defend-
ant not serve a term of supervised release.187 In another case, the
judge checked a box to impose a discretionary condition of super-
vised release, but then rewrote the condition almost verbatim in
the "additional supervised release terms" section of the judgment-
and-commitment form.188 Checking boxes therefore does not ap-
pear to be an effective substitute for writing out standard condi-
tions of supervised release.
The proposed change would also help mitigate a related prob-
lem: discretionary conditions whose language is overly broad or
vague. The Seventh Circuit has explained that "conditions of su-
pervised release must make clear what conduct is prohibited...
as well as the scope of the provisions."189 Sentencing judges nev-
ertheless impose overly broad 90 or vague 91 discretionary super-
vised release conditions in a nonnegligible number of cases. This
issue is concerning because it creates more opportunities for pro-
bation officers to abuse their power in enforcing supervised re-
lease conditions: "The depth of probation officers' discretion, ex-
ercised largely behind closed doors, [ ] raises all the old concerns
about disparity in punishment among defendants. It also raises
the possibility of the unequal treatment of minorities, the poor,
and the politically powerless."192 It is plausible that the first rec-
ommendation proposed in this Comment can have the effect of
reducing these concerns by nudging sentencing judges and their
187 See Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Burnes, Criminal Action No 12-
00162, *3 (ND Ill filed June 25, 2013).
188 See Harris Judgment and Commitment Order at *3-4 (cited in note 130).
189 Baker, 755 F3d at 529.
190 See, for example, United States v Benhoff, 755 F3d 504, 506 (7th Cir 2014) (vacat-
ing a supervised release condition that prohibited a convicted transporter of child pornog-
raphy from possessing "sexually stimulating material" because this ban was not narrowly
tailored to the defendant's criminal conduct); United States v Ramos, 763 F3d 45, 60-63
(1st Cir 2014) (amending a supervised release condition prohibiting a sex offender from
accessing the Internet without permission from a probation officer because of a lack of
evidence that the sex offender used the Internet for criminal purposes).
191 See, for example, Baker, 755 F3d at 524 (noting the ambiguity in supervised re-
lease conditions prohibiting a defendant from consuming an "excessive" amount of alcohol
or purchasing "mood altering substances" and ruling that these conditions did "not pass
muster"); Siegel, 753 F3d at 712, 715 (finding a supervised condition prohibiting a sex
offender from possessing any material containing "nudity" to be a "muddle" and question-
ing whether a supervised condition prohibiting the consumption of "mood altering sub-
stances" applies to blueberries).
192 Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1014 (cited in note 2).
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law clerks to more carefully weigh supervised release conditions
and their language.
B. Holding a Brief Hearing Immediately Before the Defendant
Begins Supervised Release
Given the challenging timing for imposing supervised
release, commentators have proposed that sentencing judges hold
brief hearings immediately before defendants begin supervised
release to reconsider its imposition. 193 These commentators argue
that, after defendants complete their prison sentences,
sentencing judges will have significantly better information for
determining the appropriate conditions of supervised release.
However, as explained below, existing proposals capturing this
idea are flawed because they are likely infeasible and
inefficient.94 This Comment advocates for a more measured
approach that addresses these concerns as well as a fundamental
problem underlying judges' noncompliance with § 3553(a) in
many cases: the absence of helpful information at sentencing
about defendants' relative risks to public safety and their
rehabilitation needs upon leaving prison. When judges have
access to such information, they confront lower decision costs in
independently weighing discretionary conditions and are
therefore more likely to comply with their statutory obligations.
This Comment recommends that when imposing terms of
supervised release, sentencing judges should evaluate whether
they have sufficient information to justify all of the discretionary
conditions under consideration. If they lack this information, then
sentencing judges should impose only the conditions for which
they have sufficient information and then decide whether they
should issue an order under § 3583(e)(2) to mandate that the
defendants return to court immediately before beginning
supervised release. 195 Sentencing judges should decline to hold
these additional sentencing hearings if they believe that there
will still be insufficient information to impose additional
conditions that they are considering. In these situations,
sentencing judges should not impose such conditions because
Congress intended that supervised release be imposed at
sentencing and not be punitive.196 This recommendation works in
193 See notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
194 See notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
195 See notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
196 See note 9. See also text accompanying note 86.
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tandem with this Comment's first suggestion. If sentencing
judges modify form AO-245B as previously suggested, they are
more likely to become aware that they lack sufficient information
to justify the imposition of certain discretionary conditions, which
is critical to implementing this second recommendation.
If the sentencing judge were to determine that a second
sentencing hearing was warranted, the judge would then have the
opportunity to modify the discretionary conditions imposed based
on the best available information about the defendant's public-
safety risk and rehabilitative needs. This information would
enable the judge to comply with § 3553(a) by independently and
informedly assessing the other discretionary conditions
considered at sentencing. This information would also enable the
judge to comply with § 3553(c) because he would be able to
decisively explain or reject any additional conditions considered
at sentencing that he did not impose due to uncertainty about the
defendant's postimprisonment state. This approach would
simplify judges' sentencing decisions by "structur[ing] the
complex choice"'19 that imposing and explaining discretionary
conditions poses. If sentencing judges follow this procedure, they
would have less reason to feel that tailoring supervised release to
a defendant's individual circumstances constitutes a task
requiring a crystal ball or one more difficult than that facing King
Solomon.198
This suggestion improves on past proposals in two ways: (1) it
remedies judicial noncompliance with § 3553(c), and (2) it is more
efficient and practical than a blanket requirement that follow-up
hearings occur for all terms of supervised release. A previous com-
mentator has suggested that when sentencing judges impose
terms of supervised release, they should impose the maximum
term and then decide at a postimprisonment hearing whether to
shorten or eliminate the term. 199 The Seventh Circuit has simi-
larly proposed that judges hold second sentencing hearings im-
mediately before defendants begin supervised release so that
judges can reconsider the conditions imposed.200 These pro-
posals are incomplete because they fail to respond to the chal-
lenge for judges of providing reasons at sentencing for the su-
pervised release conditions imposed. In addition, it may be
197 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 94 (cited in note 167).
198 See Jackson Excerpt Transcript at *26-27.
199 See Scott-Hayward, 18 Berkeley J Crim L at 222 (cited in note 6).
200 See Siegel, 753 F3d at 717.
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unrealistic to expect sentencing judges to hold second sentencing
hearings on their own initiative for all cases in which supervised
release is imposed. Given federal judges' incentives2 °1 and the fre-
quency with which defendants receive terms of supervised re-
lease,202 a more moderate approach to reconsidering supervised
release terms is necessary.
This Comment's approach diverges from previous sugges-
tions by grounding the sentencing judge's decision regarding a
second sentencing hearing on whether he has adequate infor-
mation in the initial hearing to give reasons for imposing discre-
tionary conditions of supervised release. Thus, this framework
can be conceptualized as an adaptation of the Hand Formula for
supervised release:203 the sentencing judge compares the cost (C)
of holding a second sentencing hearing to the product of the value
(V) of better information regarding the defendant's risk to public
safety and rehabilitation needs and the probability that this in-
formation will exist (P). This calculation tracks § 3553(c) by di-
recting the sentencing judge to consider whether he has the nec-
essary information to give reasons for imposing discretionary
conditions of supervised release. If the judge believes that this in-
formation will likely be available at a second sentencing hearing,
then this realization would signal to the judge that PV > C. In
such a case, the judge would then order that the defendant appear
at an additional sentencing hearing immediately before begin-
ning his term of supervised release. Ultimately, this approach is
advantageous because it efficiently allows sentencing judges to
avoid second sentencing hearings when they conclude either that
(1) they have sufficient information to give reasons for imposing
all necessary discretionary conditions at sentencing, or that (2) a
second sentencing hearing is unlikely to produce additional infor-
mation that would justify additional discretionary conditions.
In response to this proposal, several counterarguments de-
serve consideration. First, it may be unrealistic to think that sen-
tencing judges are capable of knowing P or V and, even if they
201 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of
Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 36, 48-50 (Har-
vard 2013) ("We expect leisure preference to play a greater role in judicial than in most
other employments because of life tenure and the invariability of the judicial salary to
performance.").
202 See note 62 and accompanying text.
203 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (detailing
a similar approach that weighs the burden of preventing harm against the harm's proba-
bility and magnitude).
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are, that they can adequately compare PV to C. Judge Learned
Hand recognized the difficulty of estimating p,204 and scholars
have recently recognized the inherent value judgment of apprais-
ing V, which in this case is the difference between the information
available before and after a defendant serves prison time.205
In response to this counterargument, the values of P, V, and
C can be estimated and compared through sentencing judges' de-
terminations of whether they have sufficient information to im-
pose all of the discretionary conditions that they believe are nec-
essary. Within this framework, P represents judges' relative
confidence that there will be additional information at the second
sentencing hearing for imposing a necessary discretionary condi-
tion, while C is the cost to the judge of holding the second sen-
tencing hearing. Finally, V can be evaluated by the sentencing
judge based on the length of the defendant's prison sentence and
the defendant's background and circumstances. Although none of
these variables can be precisely measured, sentencing judges can
weigh them when determining the discretionary conditions that
should be imposed, just as judges have used "the method [that the
Hand Formula] capsulizes ... to determine negligence ever since
negligence was first used as a standard of liability in accident
cases."206 By adopting this perspective, judges can not only comply
with § 3553(a) and (c) but also make the system of supervised re-
lease more effective and efficient.
A second counterargument is that this proposal presumes
that sentencing judges would be willing to create more work for
themselves by holding additional sentencing hearings, which may
not be realistic. In response to this counterargument, there are
two other important incentives that erode judicial hesitance to
hold second sentencing hearings. First, judges generally exhibit
reversal aversion because they dislike the probable increase in
their workload from "rehearing a case or rebutting criticism that
accompan[ies] a reversal."207 Second, judges generally desire the
204 See Moisan v Loftus, 178 F2d 148, 149 (2d Cir 1949) ("[O]f these factors care is the
only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, and often [it] is not .... [A]lthough
probability might theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never
are; and, besides, probability varies with the severity of the injuries.").
205 See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand L Rev 813, 818-19 (2001) (stating
that the Hand Formula requires value judgments and discussing some frameworks within
which to make them).
206 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.1 at 194 (Aspen 9th ed 2014).
207 Epstein, Landes, and Posner, Behavior of Federal Judges at 49 (cited in note 201).
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"internal satisfaction of feeling that [they are] doing a good job."208
These countervailing incentives might motivate some judges to
hold second sentencing hearings when there would be adequate
information at the second hearing to independently assess and
give reasons for discretionary conditions.209 By tying the decision
regarding second sentencing hearings to these two other incen-
tives, judges will likely be much more willing to order such hear-
ings and thereby improve their compliance with § 3553(a) and (c).
CONCLUSION
Although not legally deficient, form AO-245B contributes to
a potential pitfall for judicial noncompliance with § 3553(a) and
(c) by listing the first thirteen standard conditions in boilerplate
language. This default formatting and the challenging timing for
imposing supervised release together induce sentencing judges to
routinely impose standard conditions without considering their
appropriateness. This Comment found that in 73.9 percent of su-
pervised release terms in which standard conditions were im-
posed, sentencing judges failed to give reasons for imposing them
despite a trifecta of explicit reminders from the Seventh Circuit.
This conclusion and data point "are a reminder that it is not
enough for Congress to declare an action an obligation for the ac-
tion to be undertaken. The obligations have to be designed in
ways that speak to the incentives of the actors in the legal system
who will undertake the desired action.210
Behavioral psychology research suggests that removing the
boilerplate standard conditions could help remedy this problem
by forcing sentencing judges to more actively consider the condi-
tions' merit and by reminding judges that they need to give rea-
sons for imposing such conditions. Moreover, federal judges' in-
centives suggest that their decisions to hold follow-up sentencing
hearings should be conceptually tied to their ability to comply
with § 3553(a) and (c) at sentencing. This Comment's contribution
208 Id at 48.
209 This theory of judicial behavior is consistent with the previous discussion of judi-
cial incentives because it posits that sentencing judges are willing to perform additional
work when doing so will make it easier to make hard decisions and follow the law.
210 M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An
Empirical Test of Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, 44 J Legal Stud *21
(forthcoming 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WB9A-QY7P. The Seventh Circuit has un-
derscored this point. See United States v Kappes, 782 F3d 828, 867 (7th Cir 2015) ("A
sentencing judge might be tempted to conclude that the imposition of discretionary condi-
tions of supervised release is more trouble than it is worth.").
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nonetheless rests on one final question: Why would sentencing
judges follow these suggestions when they have failed to adhere
to mandatory appellate guidance?
Although judges may not follow this Comment's recommen-
dations, there are several reasons to be hopeful. First, sentencing
judges might find this Comment's proposed approach for second
sentencing hearings more feasible than that of the Seventh Cir-
cuit.211 This Comment's approach results in the burden of such
hearings not for every term of supervised release but rather only
when doing so would be efficient. Second, moving into 2015, the
Seventh Circuit has continued to admonish sentencing judges
who ignore the requirement of providing reasons for imposing
standard conditions and are unlucky enough to have their cases
appealed.212 Since "[j]udges do not like having their decisions re-
versed by higher courts,213 some sentencing judges may no longer
be willing to take the chance that litigants may appeal their cases.
Third, as the Seventh Circuit recently observed, "sentencing
judge[s] might be frustrated with the task of navigating the
maze214 associated with imposing supervised release. They may
be looking for ways to make this task more manageable. For these
reasons, sentencing judges may be receptive to this Comment's
practical advice about how they can improve their compliance
with § 3553(a) and (c).
These recommendations may be especially attractive to some
sentencing judges who are unfamiliar with provisions of standard
conditions, their discretionary nature, and the explanation re-
quirement. These judges presumably have a greater desire to fol-
low § 3553(c) than judges who have knowingly violated this stat-
ute. Ultimately, sentencing judges should write all standard
conditions and focus on the sufficiency of information available at
sentencing so that they are more likely to follow the law.
211 See Part III.B.
212 See United States v McMillian, 777 F3d 444, 451 (7th Cir 2015); Kappes, 782 F3d
at 867.
213 Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L
Rev 469, 477 (1998).
214 Kappes, 782 F3d at 867.
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